# ---------------------------------------------------------------
# Core ModSecurity Rule Set ver.2.0.3
# Copyright (C) 2006-2009 Breach Security Inc. All rights reserved.
#
# The ModSecuirty Core Rule Set is distributed under GPL version 2
# Please see the enclosed LICENCE file for full details.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------


#
# TODO in some cases a valid client (usually automated) generates requests that
#      violates the HTTP protocol. Create exceptions for those clients, but try
#      to limit the exception to a source IP or other additional properties of 
#      the request such as URL and not allow the violation generally. 
#  
#

# Validate request line
#
SecRule REQUEST_LINE "!^(?:(?:[a-z]{3,10}\s+(?:\w{3,7}?://[\w\-\./]*(?::\d+)?)?/[^?#]*(?:\?[^#\s]*)?(?:#[\S]*)?|connect (?:\d{1,3}\.){3}\d{1,3}\.?(?::\d+)?|options \*)\s+[\w\./]+|get /[^?#]*(?:\?[^#\s]*)?(?:#[\S]*)?)$" \
    "t:none,t:lowercase,phase:2,block,nolog,auditlog,status:400,msg:'Invalid HTTP Request Line',id:'960911',severity:'4',setvar:'tx.msg=%{rule.msg}',setvar:tx.anomaly_score=+5,setvar:tx.protocol_violation_score=+1,setvar:'tx.%{rule.id}-PROTOCOL_VIOLATION/INVALID_REQ-%{matched_var_name}=%{matched_var}'"


# Block request with malformed content.
# ModSecurity will not inspect these, but the server application might do so
#
SecRule REQBODY_PROCESSOR_ERROR "!@eq 0" "t:none,phase:2,block,nolog,auditlog,status:400,msg:'Request Body Parsing Failed. %{REQBODY_PROCESSOR_ERROR_MSG}',id:'960912',severity:'4',setvar:'tx.msg=%{rule.msg}',setvar:tx.anomaly_score=+100,setvar:tx.protocol_violation_score=+1,setvar:tx.%{rule.id}-PROTOCOL_VIOLATION/INVALID_REQ-%{matched_var_name}=%{matched_var}"

# By default be strict with what we accept in the multipart/form-data
# request body. If the rule below proves to be too strict for your
# environment consider changing it to detection-only. You are encouraged
# _not_ to remove it altogether.
SecRule MULTIPART_STRICT_ERROR "!@eq 0" \
"phase:2,t:none,block,nolog,auditlog,msg:'Multipart request body \
failed strict validation: \
PE %{REQBODY_PROCESSOR_ERROR}, \
BQ %{MULTIPART_BOUNDARY_QUOTED}, \
BW %{MULTIPART_BOUNDARY_WHITESPACE}, \
DB %{MULTIPART_DATA_BEFORE}, \
DA %{MULTIPART_DATA_AFTER}, \
HF %{MULTIPART_HEADER_FOLDING}, \
LF %{MULTIPART_LF_LINE}, \
SM %{MULTIPART_SEMICOLON_MISSING}, \
IQ %{MULTIPART_INVALID_QUOTING}',id:960914,severity:'2',setvar:'tx.msg=%{rule.msg}',setvar:tx.anomaly_score=+90,setvar:tx.protocol_violation_score=+1,setvar:tx.%{rule.id}-PROTOCOL_VIOLATION/INVALID_REQ-%{matched_var_name}=%{matched_var}"

# Did we see anything that might be a boundary?
SecRule MULTIPART_UNMATCHED_BOUNDARY "!@eq 0" \
"phase:2,block,t:none,nolog,auditlog,msg:'Multipart parser detected a possible unmatched boundary.',severity:'2',setvar:'tx.msg=%{rule.msg}',setvar:tx.anomaly_score=+20,setvar:tx.protocol_violation_score=+1,setvar:tx.%{rule.id}-PROTOCOL_VIOLATION/INVALID_REQ-%{matched_var_name}=%{matched_var}"

# Identify multipart/form-data name evasion attempts 
SecRule FILES "['\";=]" "phase:2,block,t:none,nolog,auditlog,msg:'Attempted multipart/form-data bypass',severity:'2',setvar:'tx.msg=%{rule.msg}',setvar:tx.anomaly_score=+20,setvar:tx.protocol_violation_score=+1,setvar:tx.%{rule.id}-PROTOCOL_VIOLATION/INVALID_REQ-%{matched_var_name}=%{matched_var}"
SecRule FILES_NAMES "['\";=]" "phase:2,block,t:none,nolog,auditlog,msg:'Attempted multipart/form-data bypass',severity:'2',setvar:'tx.msg=%{rule.msg}',setvar:tx.anomaly_score=+20,setvar:tx.protocol_violation_score=+1,setvar:tx.%{rule.id}-PROTOCOL_VIOLATION/INVALID_REQ-%{matched_var_name}=%{matched_var}"

# Accept only digits in content length 
#
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Length "!^\d+$" "phase:2,t:none,block,nolog,auditlog,status:400,msg:'Content-Length HTTP header is not numeric', severity:'2',id:'960016',tag:'PROTOCOL_VIOLATION/INVALID_HREQ',setvar:'tx.msg=%{rule.msg}',setvar:tx.anomaly_score=+5,setvar:tx.policy_score=+1,setvar:tx.%{rule.id}-POLICY/IP_HOST-%{matched_var_name}=%{matched_var}"

# Do not accept GET or HEAD requests with bodies
# HTTP standard allows GET requests to have a body but this
# feature is not used in real life. Attackers could try to force
# a request body on an unsuspecting web applications.
#
SecRule REQUEST_METHOD "^(?:GET|HEAD)$" "chain,phase:2,t:none,block,nolog,auditlog,status:400,msg:'GET or HEAD requests with bodies', severity:'2',id:'960011',tag:'PROTOCOL_VIOLATION/EVASION'"
	SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Length "!^0?$" "t:none,setvar:'tx.msg=%{rule.msg}',setvar:tx.protocol_violation_score=+1,setvar:tx.anomaly_score=+5,setvar:tx.%{rule.id}-PROTOCOL_VIOLATION/INVALID_HREQ-%{matched_var_name}=%{matched_var}"

# Require Content-Length to be provided with every POST request.
#
SecRule REQUEST_METHOD "^POST$" "chain,phase:2,t:none,block,nolog,auditlog,status:400,msg:'POST request must have a Content-Length header',id:'960012',tag:'PROTOCOL_VIOLATION/EVASION',severity:'4'"
	SecRule &REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Length "@eq 0" "t:none,setvar:'tx.msg=%{rule.msg}',setvar:tx.anomaly_score=+5,setvar:tx.protocol_violation_score=+1,setvar:tx.%{rule.id}-PROTOCOL_VIOLATION/INVALID_HREQ-%{matched_var_name}=%{matched_var}"

# Don't accept transfer encodings we know we don't know how to handle
#
# NOTE ModSecurity does not support chunked transfer encodings at
#      this time. You MUST reject all such requests.
#
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Transfer-Encoding "!^$" "phase:2,t:none,block,nolog,auditlog,status:501,msg:'ModSecurity does not support transfer encodings',id:'960013',tag:'PROTOCOL_VIOLATION/EVASION',severity:'4',setvar:'tx.msg=%{rule.msg}',setvar:tx.anomaly_score=+5,setvar:tx.protocol_violation_score=+1,setvar:tx.%{rule.id}-PROTOCOL_VIOLATION/INVALID_HREQ-%{matched_var_name}=%{matched_var}"

# Expect header is an HTTP/1.1 protocol feature
#
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Expect "100-continue" "chain,phase:2,t:none,nolog,block,auditlog,msg:'Expect Header Not Allowed.',severity:'5',id:'960021',tag:'PROTOCOL_VIOLATION/INVALID_HREQ'"
	SecRule REQUEST_PROTOCOL "@streq HTTP/1.0" "setvar:'tx.msg=%{rule.msg}',setvar:tx.anomaly_score=+5,setvar:tx.protocol_violation_score=+1,setvar:tx.%{rule.id}-PROTOCOL_VIOLATION/INVALID_HREQ-%{matched_var_name}=%{matched_var}"

# Pragma Header requires a Cache-Control Header
#	
SecRule &REQUEST_HEADERS:Pragma "@eq 1" "chain,phase:2,t:none,block,nolog,auditlog,msg:'Pragma Header requires Cache-Control Header for HTTP/1.1 requests.',severity:'5',id:'960020',tag:'PROTOCOL_VIOLATION/INVALID_HREQ'"
	SecRule &REQUEST_HEADERS:Cache-Control "@eq 0" "chain"
		SecRule REQUEST_PROTOCOL "@streq HTTP/1.1" "setvar:'tx.msg=%{rule.msg}',setvar:tx.anomaly_score=+5,setvar:tx.protocol_violation_score=+1,setvar:tx.%{rule.id}-PROTOCOL_VIOLATION/INVALID_HREQ-%{matched_var_name}=%{matched_var}"

# Range Header exists and begins with 0 - normal browsers don't do this.
#		
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Range "@contains =0-" "phase:2,t:none,block,nolog,auditlog,msg:'Range: field exists and begins with 0.',severity:'5',id:'958291',tag:'PROTOCOL_VIOLATION/INVALID_HREQ',setvar:'tx.msg=%{rule.msg}',setvar:tx.anomaly_score=+5,setvar:tx.protocol_violation_score=+1,setvar:tx.%{rule.id}-PROTOCOL_VIOLATION/INVALID_HREQ-%{matched_var_name}=%{matched_var}"

# Broken/Malicous clients often have duplicate or conflicting headers
#
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Connection "\b(keep-alive|close),\s?(keep-alive|close)\b" "phase:2,t:none,block,nolog,auditlog,status:400,msg:'Multiple/Conflicting Connection Header Data Found.',id:'958295',tag:'PROTOCOL_VIOLATION/INVALID_HREQ',severity:'5',setvar:'tx.msg=%{rule.msg}',setvar:tx.anomaly_score=+5,setvar:tx.protocol_violation_score=+1,setvar:tx.%{rule.id}-PROTOCOL_VIOLATION/INVALID_HREQ-%{matched_var_name}=%{matched_var}"

# Check encodings
SecRule REQUEST_URI "\%(?!$|\W|[0-9a-fA-F]{2}|u[0-9a-fA-F]{4})" \
	"chain,phase:2,t:none,block,nolog,auditlog,status:400,msg:'URL Encoding Abuse Attack Attempt',id:'950107',tag:'PROTOCOL_VIOLATION/EVASION',severity:'5'"
	SecRule REQUEST_URI "@validateUrlEncoding" "setvar:'tx.msg=%{rule.msg}',setvar:tx.anomaly_score=+5,setvar:tx.protocol_violation_score=+1,setvar:tx.%{rule.id}-PROTOCOL_VIOLATION/EVASION-%{matched_var_name}=%{matched_var}"

SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Type "^application\/x-www-form-urlencoded(?:;(?:\s?charset\s?=\s?[\w\d\-]{1,18})?)??$" \
	"chain,phase:2,t:none,block,nolog,auditlog,status:400,msg:'URL Encoding Abuse Attack Attempt',id:'950108',tag:'PROTOCOL_VIOLATION/EVASION',severity:'5'"
	SecRule REQUEST_BODY "\%(?!$|\W|[0-9a-fA-F]{2}|u[0-9a-fA-F]{4})" "chain"
		SecRule REQUEST_BODY "@validateUrlEncoding" "setvar:'tx.msg=%{rule.msg}',setvar:tx.anomaly_score=+5,setvar:tx.protocol_violation_score=+1,setvar:tx.%{rule.id}-PROTOCOL_VIOLATION/EVASION-%{matched_var_name}=%{matched_var}"

# Check UTF enconding
# This rule checks to see if your system uses UTF encoding.
SecRule RESPONSE_HEADERS:Content-Type "charset=utf-8" \
	"phase:3,t:none,pass,nolog,setvar:global.utf8_encoding_used=1"

# If UTF-8 encoding was detected in the server's respone headers, run this rule on inbound data.
SecRule GLOBAL:UTF8_ENCODING_USED "@eq 1" "chain,phase:2,t:none,block,nolog,auditlog,status:400,msg:'UTF8 Encoding Abuse Attack Attempt',id:'950801',tag:'PROTOCOL_VIOLATION/EVASION',severity:'5'"
	SecRule REQUEST_URI|REQUEST_BODY|REQUEST_HEADERS|XML:/*|!REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer "@validateUtf8Encoding" "setvar:'tx.msg=%{rule.msg}',setvar:tx.anomaly_score=+5,setvar:tx.protocol_violation_score=+1,setvar:tx.%{rule.id}-PROTOCOL_VIOLATION/EVASION-%{matched_var_name}=%{matched_var}"


# Disallow use of full-width unicode
SecRule REQUEST_URI|REQUEST_BODY|REQUEST_HEADERS|XML:/*|!REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer "\%u[fF]{2}[0-9a-fA-F]{2}" \
  "t:none,phase:2,block,nolog,auditlog,status:400,msg:'Unicode Full/Half Width Abuse Attack Attempt',id:'950116',severity:'5',setvar:'tx.msg=%{rule.msg}',setvar:tx.anomaly_score=+5,setvar:tx.protocol_violation_score=+1,setvar:tx.%{rule.id}-PROTOCOL_VIOLATION/EVASION-%{matched_var_name}=%{matched_var}"

# Proxy access attempt
# NOTE Apache blocks such access by default if not set as a proxy. The rule is 
#      included in case Apache proxy is misconfigured.
# NOTE There are some clients (mobile devices) that will send a full URI even when connecting to
#      your local application and this rule allows it.
# NOTE Need to have UseCononicalName On in Apache config to properly set the SERVER_NAME variable.
SecRule REQUEST_URI_RAW ^\w+:/ "chain,phase:2,t:none,block,nolog,auditlog,status:400,msg:'Proxy access attempt', severity:'2',id:'960014',tag:'PROTOCOL_VIOLATION/PROXY_ACCESS'"
	SecRule MATCHED_VAR "!@beginsWith http://%{SERVER_NAME}" "setvar:'tx.msg=%{rule.msg}',setvar:tx.anomaly_score=+5,setvar:tx.protocol_violation_score=+1,setvar:tx.%{rule.id}-PROTOCOL_VIOLATION/PROXY_ACCESS-%{matched_var_name}=%{matched_var}"

#
# Restrict type of characters sent
#
# NOTE In order to be broad and support localized applications this rule
#      only validates that NULL Is not used.
#
#	   The strict policy version also validates that protocol and application 
#	   generated fields are limited to printable ASCII. 
#
# TODO If your application use the range 32-126 for parameters.
#
#SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME|REQUEST_HEADERS_NAMES|REQUEST_HEADERS|!REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer \
#	"@validateByteRange 32-126" \
#	"phase:2,block,nolog,auditlog,status:400,msg:'Invalid character in request',id:'960018',tag:'PROTOCOL_VIOLATION/EVASION',severity:'4',t:none,t:urlDecodeUni,setvar:'tx.msg=%{rule.msg}',setvar:tx.anomaly_score=+5,setvar:tx.protocol_violation_score=+1,setvar:tx.%{rule.id}-PROTOCOL_VIOLATION/EVASION-%{matched_var_name}=%{matchedvar}"

SecRule ARGS|ARGS_NAMES|REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer "@validateByteRange 1-255" \
	"phase:2,block,nolog,auditlog,status:400,msg:'Invalid character in request',id:'960901',tag:'PROTOCOL_VIOLATION/EVASION',severity:'4',t:none,t:urlDecodeUni,setvar:'tx.msg=%{rule.msg}',setvar:tx.anomaly_score=+5,setvar:tx.protocol_violation_score=+1,setvar:tx.%{rule.id}-PROTOCOL_VIOLATION/EVASION-%{matched_var_name}=%{matched_var}"