RPKI validated cache Update in SLURM over HTTPs (RUSH)

Abstract

This document defines a method for transferring RPKI validated cache update information in JSON object format over HTTPs.¶

1. Introduction

This document defines a mechanism called “RPKI validated cache Update in SLURM [RFC 8416] over HTTPs (RUSH)”, for the use of SLURM in updating RPKI cache data over HTTP [RFC7540] using HTTPs [RFC2818] URIs (and therefore TLS [RFC8446] security for integrity and confidentiality). Integration with HTTPs provides a secure transport for distributing cache data, which is in alignment with SLURM file format in order to take advantage of using one same API for a cache server to do both remote update and local override.¶

The RPKI validated cache in this document refers to the validated data of assertion information certified by corresponding RPKI signed objects such as ROA [RFC6482] and BGPsec router certificate [RFC8209], which are transferred from the RPKI cache server to routers by RTR protocol [RFC8210] for the use of the RPKI. SLURM offers a standardized method for describing RPKI cache data in JSON format [RFC8259], and SLURM is designed to carry out incremental update.¶

Note that RUSH merely focuses on a standardized transport and data format of the RPKI cache data. RUSH has nothing to do with synchronization at the RUSH end system, that is, more sophisticated functions such as automatic re-synchronization and access control is out of this scope and MAY be left to private implementation.¶

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT","REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶

3. RUSH Usecase

• Cache Distribution¶

RUSH can be used to distribute a RPKI validated cache within a single ASN or network, for example a confederation composed of a number of ASes. A small site or enterprise network MAY also use RUSH by synchronizing with a third-party RPKI cache provider over external networks.¶

• Local Control over Networks¶

Network operators MAY want to inject SLURM Assertions/Filters via an API offered by RPKI validator/cache. RUSH is therefore able to carry out such local control signals inside an administrative bailiwick in a secure manner.¶

• Private Assertions Within IXP Members¶

IXP members MAY peer with one another by exchanging private IP address or private AS numbers, where the very IXP operator assumes the responsibility of coordinating the INR assignment within its bailiwick of local peering. This scenario calls for a mechanism of distributing those local assertions expressed in SLURM file from this IXP operator to relying parties systems deployed by IXP members in question in alignment with RPKI validation.¶

To summarize, RUSH MUST be used in scenarios where the authenticity of SLURM files can be assured when carried over multiple administrative domains. Alternatively, RUSH SHOULD be used inside an administrative domain to provide extra security by the virtue of pre-configured trust anchors.¶

4. RUSH Operations

POST /rpki-cache HTTP/2
Host: rpki.example.com
Content-Type : application/json-slurm
Content-Length:964
<964 bytes represented by the following json string>
{
       "slurmVersion": 1,
       "validationOutputFilters": {
         "prefixFilters": [
           {
             "prefix": "192.0.2.0/24",
             "comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix"
           },
           {
             "asn": 64496,
             "comment": "All VRPs matching ASN"
           },
           {
             "prefix": "198.51.100.0/24",
             "asn": 64497,
             "comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix, matching ASN"
           }
         ],
         "bgpsecFilters": [
           {
             "asn": 64496,
             "comment": "All keys for ASN"
           },
           {
             "SKI": "Zm9v",
             "comment": "Key matching Router SKI"
           },
           {
             "asn": 64497,
             "SKI": "YmFy",
             "comment": "Key for ASN 64497 matching Router SKI"
           }
         ]
       },
       "locallyAddedAssertions": {
         "prefixAssertions": [
           {
             "asn": 64496,
             "prefix": "198.51.100.0/24",
             "comment": "My other important route"
           },
           {
             "asn": 64496,
             "prefix": "2001:DB8::/32",
             "maxPrefixLength": 48,
             "comment": "My other important de-aggregated routes"
           }
         ],
         "bgpsecAssertions": [
           {
             "asn": 64496,
             "comment" : "My known key for my important ASN",
             "SKI": "<some base64 SKI>",
             "routerPublicKey": "<some base64 public key>"
           }
         ]
       }
}

5. IANA Considerations

Type name: application¶

Subtype name: json-slurm¶

Subtype name: json-slurm¶

Optional parameters: N/A¶

Encoding considerations: This is a JSON object.¶

Security considerations: N/A¶

Interoperability considerations: [RFC8416]¶

Published specification:¶

Applications that use this media type:¶

Systems that want to exchange RPKI cache data update information in SLURM file format [RFC8416] over HTTPs.¶

Person&email address to contact for further information: Di Ma <madi@zdns.cn>¶

Intended usage: COMMON¶

Restrictions on usage: N/A¶

Author: Di Ma <madi@zdns.cn>¶

Change controller: IESG¶

6. Security Considerations

Note that RPKI offers signed-object-oriented security, which is not provided by RUSH any longer. There are some security issues must be handled properly as per different usecases as described in Section 3.¶

Cache Identity: RUSH is designed to carry out RPKI cache data update from one to another, with out-of-band trust established between those cache servers. That is, the scope of RUSH usage is convergent. Cache subscription management might be employed to implement cache identification and verification. The RPKI cache server security and the trust model for the interaction between cache servers is out of the scope of this document.¶

Transport Security: Updating RPKI validated cache over HTTPs relies on the security of the underlying HTTPs transport. Implementations utilizing HTTP/2 benefit from the TLS profile defined in Section 9.2 of [RFC7540].¶

Data Integrity: An HTTPS connection provides transport security for the interaction between cache servers, but it does not provide data integrity detection. An adversary that can control the cache used by the subscriber can affect that subscriber's view of the RPKI.¶

7. Acknowledgments

TBD¶

8. References