3 # Whatever you do, do NOT set 'Auth-Type := EAP'. The server
4 # is smart enough to figure this out on its own. The most
5 # common side effect of setting 'Auth-Type := EAP' is that the
6 # users then cannot use ANY other authentication method.
8 # $Id: eap.conf,v 1.4.4.4 2006/10/18 19:15:14 aland Exp $
11 # Invoke the default supported EAP type when
12 # EAP-Identity response is received.
14 # The incoming EAP messages DO NOT specify which EAP
15 # type they will be using, so it MUST be set here.
17 # For now, only one default EAP type may be used at a time.
19 # If the EAP-Type attribute is set by another module,
20 # then that EAP type takes precedence over the
21 # default type configured here.
23 default_eap_type = ttls
25 # A list is maintained to correlate EAP-Response
26 # packets with EAP-Request packets. After a
27 # configurable length of time, entries in the list
28 # expire, and are deleted.
32 # There are many EAP types, but the server has support
33 # for only a limited subset. If the server receives
34 # a request for an EAP type it does not support, then
35 # it normally rejects the request. By setting this
36 # configuration to "yes", you can tell the server to
37 # instead keep processing the request. Another module
38 # MUST then be configured to proxy the request to
39 # another RADIUS server which supports that EAP type.
41 # If another module is NOT configured to handle the
42 # request, then the request will still end up being
44 ignore_unknown_eap_types = no
46 # Cisco AP1230B firmware 12.2(13)JA1 has a bug. When given
47 # a User-Name attribute in an Access-Accept, it copies one
48 # more byte than it should.
50 # We can work around it by configurably adding an extra
52 cisco_accounting_username_bug = no
57 # We do NOT recommend using EAP-MD5 authentication
58 # for wireless connections. It is insecure, and does
59 # not provide for dynamic WEP keys.
66 # We do not recommend using LEAP in new deployments. See:
67 # http://www.securiteam.com/tools/5TP012ACKE.html
69 # Cisco LEAP uses the MS-CHAP algorithm (but not
70 # the MS-CHAP attributes) to perform it's authentication.
72 # As a result, LEAP *requires* access to the plain-text
73 # User-Password, or the NT-Password attributes.
74 # 'System' authentication is impossible with LEAP.
81 # Currently, this is only permitted inside of EAP-TTLS,
82 # or EAP-PEAP. The module "challenges" the user with
83 # text, and the response from the user is taken to be
86 # Proxying the tunneled EAP-GTC session is a bad idea,
87 # the users password will go over the wire in plain-text,
91 # The default challenge, which many clients
93 #challenge = "Password: "
95 # The plain-text response which comes back
96 # is put into a User-Password attribute,
97 # and passed to another module for
98 # authentication. This allows the EAP-GTC
99 # response to be checked against plain-text,
100 # or crypt'd passwords.
102 # If you say "Local" instead of "PAP", then
103 # the module will look for a User-Password
104 # configured for the request, and do the
105 # authentication itself.
112 # To generate ctest certificates, run the script
114 # ../scripts/certs.sh
116 # The documents on http://www.freeradius.org/doc
117 # are old, but may be helpful.
121 # http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,9286052~mode=flat
124 private_key_password = #PASSWORD#
125 private_key_file = ${raddbdir}/certs/cert-srv.pem
127 # If Private key & Certificate are located in
128 # the same file, then private_key_file &
129 # certificate_file must contain the same file
131 certificate_file = ${raddbdir}/certs/cert-srv.pem
133 # Trusted Root CA list
134 CA_file = ${raddbdir}/certs/root.pem
136 dh_file = ${raddbdir}/certs/dh
137 random_file = /dev/urandom
140 # This can never exceed the size of a RADIUS
141 # packet (4096 bytes), and is preferably half
142 # that, to accomodate other attributes in
143 # RADIUS packet. On most APs the MAX packet
144 # length is configured between 1500 - 1600
145 # In these cases, fragment size should be
150 # include_length is a flag which is
151 # by default set to yes If set to
152 # yes, Total Length of the message is
153 # included in EVERY packet we send.
154 # If set to no, Total Length of the
155 # message is included ONLY in the
156 # First packet of a fragment series.
160 # Check the Certificate Revocation List
162 # 1) Copy CA certificates and CRLs to same directory.
163 # 2) Execute 'c_rehash <CA certs&CRLs Directory>'.
164 # 'c_rehash' is OpenSSL's command.
165 # 3) Add 'CA_path=<CA certs&CRLs directory>'
166 # to radiusd.conf's tls section.
167 # 4) uncomment the line below.
172 # If check_cert_issuer is set, the value will
173 # be checked against the DN of the issuer in
174 # the client certificate. If the values do not
175 # match, the cerficate verification will fail,
176 # rejecting the user.
178 # check_cert_issuer = "/C=GB/ST=Berkshire/L=Newbury/O=My Company Ltd"
181 # If check_cert_cn is set, the value will
182 # be xlat'ed and checked against the CN
183 # in the client certificate. If the values
184 # do not match, the certificate verification
185 # will fail rejecting the user.
187 # This check is done only if the previous
188 # "check_cert_issuer" is not set, or if
189 # the check succeeds.
191 # check_cert_cn = %{User-Name}
193 # Set this option to specify the allowed
194 # TLS cipher suites. The format is listed
195 # in "man 1 ciphers".
196 # cipher_list = "DEFAULT"
199 # The TTLS module implements the EAP-TTLS protocol,
200 # which can be described as EAP inside of Diameter,
201 # inside of TLS, inside of EAP, inside of RADIUS...
203 # Surprisingly, it works quite well.
205 # The TTLS module needs the TLS module to be installed
206 # and configured, in order to use the TLS tunnel
207 # inside of the EAP packet. You will still need to
208 # configure the TLS module, even if you do not want
209 # to deploy EAP-TLS in your network. Users will not
210 # be able to request EAP-TLS, as it requires them to
211 # have a client certificate. EAP-TTLS does not
212 # require a client certificate.
215 # The tunneled EAP session needs a default
216 # EAP type which is separate from the one for
217 # the non-tunneled EAP module. Inside of the
218 # TTLS tunnel, we recommend using EAP-MD5.
219 # If the request does not contain an EAP
220 # conversation, then this configuration entry
222 # default_eap_type = md5
224 # The tunneled authentication request does
225 # not usually contain useful attributes
226 # like 'Calling-Station-Id', etc. These
227 # attributes are outside of the tunnel,
228 # and normally unavailable to the tunneled
229 # authentication request.
231 # By setting this configuration entry to
232 # 'yes', any attribute which NOT in the
233 # tunneled authentication request, but
234 # which IS available outside of the tunnel,
235 # is copied to the tunneled request.
237 # allowed values: {no, yes}
238 copy_request_to_tunnel = yes
240 # The reply attributes sent to the NAS are
241 # usually based on the name of the user
242 # 'outside' of the tunnel (usually
243 # 'anonymous'). If you want to send the
244 # reply attributes based on the user name
245 # inside of the tunnel, then set this
246 # configuration entry to 'yes', and the reply
247 # to the NAS will be taken from the reply to
248 # the tunneled request.
250 # allowed values: {no, yes}
251 use_tunneled_reply = yes
254 ##################################################
256 # !!!!! WARNINGS for Windows compatibility !!!!!
258 ##################################################
260 # If you see the server send an Access-Challenge,
261 # and the client never sends another Access-Request,
266 # The server certificate has to have special OID's
267 # in it, or else the Microsoft clients will silently
268 # fail. See the "scripts/xpextensions" file for
269 # details, and the following page:
271 # http://support.microsoft.com/kb/814394/en-us
273 # For additional Windows XP SP2 issues, see:
275 # http://support.microsoft.com/kb/885453/en-us
277 # Note that we do not necessarily agree with their
278 # explanation... but the fix does appear to work.
280 ##################################################
283 # The tunneled EAP session needs a default EAP type
284 # which is separate from the one for the non-tunneled
285 # EAP module. Inside of the TLS/PEAP tunnel, we
286 # recommend using EAP-MS-CHAPv2.
288 # The PEAP module needs the TLS module to be installed
289 # and configured, in order to use the TLS tunnel
290 # inside of the EAP packet. You will still need to
291 # configure the TLS module, even if you do not want
292 # to deploy EAP-TLS in your network. Users will not
293 # be able to request EAP-TLS, as it requires them to
294 # have a client certificate. EAP-PEAP does not
295 # require a client certificate.
298 # The tunneled EAP session needs a default
299 # EAP type which is separate from the one for
300 # the non-tunneled EAP module. Inside of the
301 # PEAP tunnel, we recommend using MS-CHAPv2,
302 # as that is the default type supported by
304 # default_eap_type = mschapv2
306 # the PEAP module also has these configuration
307 # items, which are the same as for TTLS.
308 # copy_request_to_tunnel = no
309 # use_tunneled_reply = no
311 # When the tunneled session is proxied, the
312 # home server may not understand EAP-MSCHAP-V2.
313 # Set this entry to "no" to proxy the tunneled
314 # EAP-MSCHAP-V2 as normal MSCHAPv2.
315 # proxy_tunneled_request_as_eap = yes
319 # This takes no configuration.
321 # Note that it is the EAP MS-CHAPv2 sub-module, not
322 # the main 'mschap' module.
324 # Note also that in order for this sub-module to work,
325 # the main 'mschap' module MUST ALSO be configured.
327 # This module is the *Microsoft* implementation of MS-CHAPv2
328 # in EAP. There is another (incompatible) implementation
329 # of MS-CHAPv2 in EAP by Cisco, which FreeRADIUS does not